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Standard economic theory assumes that agents in markets behave rationally.
However, the observation of extremely large fluctuations in the price of fi-
nancial assets that are not correlated to changes in their fundamental value,
as well as the extreme instance of financial bubbles and crashes, imply that
markets (at least occasionally) do display irrational behavior. In this paper,
we briefly outline our recent work demonstrating that a market with interact-
ing agents having bounded rationality can display price fluctuations that are
quantitatively similar to those seen in real markets.
1 Introduction
It has long been debated in the economic literature whether markets exhibit
irrational behavior [1]. The historical observations of apparent financial “bub-
bles”, in which the demand (and therefore, the price) for certain assets rises
to unreasonably high levels within a very short time only to come crashing
down later [2], imply that markets act irrationally, because the rapid price
changes are not associated with changes in the fundamental value of the as-
sets. Believers in rational expectation theory argue that the price rise actually
reflects the market’s expectations about the long-term prospect of these assets
and the large fluctuations are just rapid adjustments of these expectations in
the light of new information [3]. These advocates of the “efficient market”
school of thought claim that popular descriptions of speculative mania (e.g.,
in Ref. [4]) have been often exaggerated. However, critics point out that the
market’s estimate of the long-term value of an asset is a quantity that cannot
be measured, and therefore, it is difficult to verify whether historical bubbles
were indeed rational outcomes.
In this paper, we take an intermediate position between these two oppos-
ing camps. We assume that individual agents do behave in a rational manner,
where rationality is identified with actions conducive to market equilibrium.
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In other words, rational agents will act in such a way that the market is “bal-
anced”, exhibiting neither excess demand nor supply. Therefore, we expect
only small fluctuations about the equilibrium when we have a large ensemble
of non-interacting agents. In the model presented in this paper, market behav-
ior is described by the collective decision of many interacting agents, each of
whom choose whether to buy or sell an asset based on the limited information
available to them about its prospects. In isolation, each agent behaves so as
to drive the market to equilibrium. We investigate the possibility that inter-
actions between such agents can severely destabilize the market equilibrium.
In fact, we show that when agents are allowed to modify their interactions
with neighbours, based on information about their past performance in the
market, this results in the market becoming unbalanced and exhibiting ex-
tremely large fluctuations that are quantitatively similar to those seen in real
markets.
2 Collective irrationality in an agent-based model
In this section, we present an agent-based model of the fluctuation of de-
mand for a particular asset. The agents are assumed to be operating under
bounded rationality, i.e., they try to choose between buying and selling the
asset based on information about the action of their immediate neighbors and
how successful their previous choices were. The fundamental value of the as-
set is assumed to be unchanged throughout the period. From the “efficient
markets” hypothesis, we should therefore expect to see only small departures
from the equilibrium. In addition, the agents are assumed to have limited
resources, so that they cannot continue to buy or sell indefinitely. However,
instead of introducing explicit budget constraints [5], we have implemented
gradually diminishing returns for a decision that is taken repeatedly.
We assume that all agents are placed on a lattice, each site being occupied
by one agent. An agent can only interact with its immediate neighbors on the
lattice. In the simulations reported here, we have considered a two-dimensional
hexagonal lattice, so that the number of neighbors is z = 6. At any given time
t, the state of an agent i is fully described by two variables: its choice, Sti , and
its belief about the outcome of the choice, θti . The choice can be either buy
(= +1) or sell (= −1), while the belief can vary continuously over a range.
The behavior of the agent over time can then be described by the equations
governing the dynamics of S and θ,
St+1i = sign(ΣjJ
t
ijS
t
j − θ
t
i), θ
t+1
i = θ
t
i + µiS
t+1
i , (1)
where, J tij measures the degree of interaction between neighboring agents.
The adaptation rate, µi, governs the time-scale of diminishing returns, over
which the agent switches from one choice to another in the absence of any
interactions between agents. The overall state of the market at any given time
is described by the fractional excess demand, M t = (1/N)ΣjS
t
j .
In previous work [6], we have shown that, if the interactions between agents
do not change over time (i.e., J tij = J, a constant), then M shows only small
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Fig. 1. Spontaneous fluctuations through dynamic interactions in a system of
400 × 400 agents. The adaptation rates, µi, are chosen from an uniform random
distribution between [0, 0.1]. (Left) The time series of the fractional excess demand,
M (top) and the corresponding logarithmic return, R (bottom), exhibiting signifi-
cant number of large fluctuations. (Right) The cumulative probability density func-
tion of normalized returns, r, comparing the case where the Jij are fixed in time
(squares) with the situation when the Jij change over time (circles). The latter
shows a power-law decay with an exponent close to 3.
fluctuations about 0. This accords with the “efficient markets” hypothesis
that any transient imbalance in the demand or supply of the asset is quickly
corrected through the appropriate response of agents, so that the market
remains more or less in equilibrium. However, if the agents have access to
global information about the market (i.e., M), under certain conditions this
can lead to large deviations from the market equilibrium. We have previously
shown that if M is allowed to affect the belief dynamics of agents, then the
market spends most of the time in states corresponding to excess demand or
excess supply. This kind of two-phase behavior [7] points to the destabilizing
effect of apparently innocuous information exchanges in the market.
Very recently, we have observed that the collective behavior can also be
destabilized if, instead of affecting the belief dynamics, the knowledge of M is
used in evolving the structure of interactions J tij between neighboring agents.
This is implemented by assuming that agents seek out the most successful
agents in its neighborhood, and choose to be influenced by them preferentially.
Here, success is measured by the fraction of time the agent’s decision (to buy
or sell) accorded with the market behavior. As a rise in excess demand of an
asset is taken to signal its desirability, an agent is considered successful if it
is in possession of an asset that is in high demand. If an agent i is successful
in predicting the market (i.e., its action in the last round accorded with the
majority decision of the collective) then its interaction structure is unchanged.
Otherwise, its neighboring agents with higher success are identified and the
link strength between them, Jij , is adjusted by an amount that is proportional
to the ratio of the success of agent j to agent i. This implies that agents with
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higher success affect the decision process of agents with less success, but not
the other way around. Finally, Jij is normalized such that, for each agent,
ΣiJij = 1.
Fig. 1 (left) shows the resulting time series of the fractional excess demand.
As the price P of the asset is governed by the demand for it, we can take P
to be linearly related to M . This allows us to quantify the price fluctuations
for the asset by calculating the logarithmic return of P as Rt = lnP t+1 −
lnP t. It is evident that the fluctuations are much larger than what would
have been expected from an uncorrelated random process. This is further
established when we plot the distribution of the return, normalized by its
standard deviation, and compare it with the case where the Jij are constant
in time (Fig. 1, right). While the latter case is consistent with a Gaussian
distribution, the model with adaptive interaction dynamics is found to exhibit
a return distribution that has a power law tail. Moreover, the exponent of
the cumulative distribution, α ≃ 3, is found to agree quantitatively with the
corresponding values observed in actual markets [8].
3 Conclusions
The observation of large price fluctuations (most strikingly during bubbles
or crashes) implies that markets often display instabilities where the demand
and supply are not even approximately balanced. We have seen in this paper
that this is not necessarily inconsistent with the assumption that individual
economic agents are rational. A simple agent-based model, where the structure
of interactions between agents evolve over time based on information about the
market, exhibits extremely large fluctuations around the market equilibrium
that qualitatively match the fluctuation distribution seen in real markets.
References
1. Albin P S (1998) Barriers and bounds to rationality. Princeton University Press,
Princeton
2. Chancellor E (1999) Devil take the hindmost: A history of financial speculation.
Macmillan, London
3. Garber P M (1990) Famous first bubbles, J. Economic Perspectives 4:35–54
4. MacKay C (1852) Memoirs of extraordinary popular delusions and the madness
of crowds. National Illustrated Library, London
5. Iori G (2002) A microsimulation of traders activity in the stock market: the role
of heterogeneity, agents’ interaction and trade frictions, J. Economic Behavior
& Organization 49:269–285
6. Sinha S, Raghavendra S (2004) Phase transition and pattern formation in a
model of collective choice dynamics, SFI Working Paper 04-09-028
7. Sinha S, Raghavendra S (2005) Emergence of two-phase behavior in mar-
kets through interaction and learning in agents with bounded rationality. In:
Takayasu H (ed) Practical fruits of econophysics. Springer, Tokyo :200-204
8. Gopikrishnan P, Meyer M, Amaral L A N, Stanley H E (1998) Inverse cubic law
for the distribution of stock price variations, Eur. Phys. J. B 3:139–140
